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INTRUSIVE LAW REFORM?
KATHARINE

B.

SILBAUGH*

Does law obstruct or facilitate the development of a democratic society? This is the subject of Mary Ann Glendon's recent book, A Nation
Under Lawyers. It is also the subject of Anita Bernstein's Better Living
Through Crime and Tort. Glendon takes the position that law obstructs,
that "[p]remature and excessive resort to the courts... has been a disaster for the political health of the country."' Bernstein disagrees, saying
that in many cases, law can facilitate democracy by encouraging citizens
to educate themselves, engage in debate, and form communities.
Bernstein makes her case by discussing what she calls "melioristic" law
reform: reform that proposes to change the law of both crime and tort.
Reformers use crime and tort law because they target individual behavior. Melioristic law reform thus "reveals its ambition to reach intimately
into individual lives."2 This distinguishes it from "cause lawyering,"
which is 3primarily concerned with "group-identified allocations of resources."
Bernstein argues that tort and crime are uniquely situated to control
the individual. While acknowledging that this makes them particularly
intrusive, she also argues that by focusing on the individual, melioristic
law reform puts politics where it belongs: with individuals. 4 These law
* Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law; J.D. 1992, The University
of Chicago Law School; B.A. 1985, Amherst College. I thank Hugh Baxter for helpful
suggestions.
1 MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 270 (1994). Glendon argues with Gerald Rosenberg that the activism of the Warren Court has undermined
the citizen's ability and removed her incentive to engage in vigorous public debate
over political issues. Id. at 270-72. Judicial decisions have in this way displaced political participation and contributed to the public disengagement from social issues. Id.
(arguing that the Civil Rights Movement did far more to effect school desegregation
than the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1934)); see also GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN THE COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?

15-21, 336 (1991) (arguing that courts lack the en-

forcement measures necessary to effect the pervasive social change that decisions like
Brown contemplated).
2 Anita Bernstein, Better Living Through Crime and Tort, 76 B.U. L. REv. 169, 171
(1996).
3 Id. at 170 n.4.
I Bernstein goes so far as to describe these movements as "barging into individual
lives." Id. at 190. As I argue below, this is more myth than reality, at least insofar as
the attempted use of law is concerned.
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reforms avoid the mistake of privileging the state, instead bringing attention to bear on individual experience. The virtue of melioristic law reform, says Bernstein, is its ability to engage the citizenry in self-government.
Bernstein organizes her argument around three social reform movements that she labels "melioristic:" the anti-smoking, anti-pornography,
and anti-alcohol movements, both past and present. Bernstein speaks of
these movements' attraction to changing the criminal law and the law of
tort, and to their desire to intrude on individual behavior, what she calls
"barging into individual lives." 5 She distinguishes such reform efforts
from changes to other areas of law, like tax or court procedures, that are
more distant from individual citizens. Tort and crime posit the citizen's
supremacy to the state, and show us a dispersed "tussle in a democracy."6
Because Professor Bernstein believes these melioristic law reforms represent social movements at their most intrusive and coercive, she limits
the grounds on which they earn praise. She does not take a position on
the substantive issues of smoking, pornography, or alcohol. In fact, she is
quite careful to say that social life may not be improved by any one of
these reform efforts at the substantive level. Thus her praise of these
movements differs from that of their proponents. Neither are the redistributive goals of cause lawyering the primary benefit of melioristic law
reform. Instead, she believes that process virtues are the main reason
these movements can claim to improve our lives.7
What does Bernstein mean by "process virtues?" Regardless of the
particular successes and failures of their efforts at changing law, says
Bernstein, these movements engage the citizenry and occupy a population in self-government. As such, they are part of the wealth of an affluent democracy. According to Bernstein, melioristic law reform is democratic expression that does not reify the state as singular, separate, or
above the population. Bernstein suggests that this type of reform divests
the state of its centrality by focusing on changing individual behavior.
These process virtues thus permit melioristic law reform to escape Glendon's criticism that law is not consistent with "civic endeavors associated
5 Id.

Id. at 185. In Bernstein's taxonomy, "crimes" do not include regulatory offenses;
she limits her argument to the kind of crimes an individual feels as a personal prohibition. Id. at 171 n.7.
6

7 Professor Bernstein does not address the empirical question of the degree to
which these movements actually create "better living" according to her process mea-

sure. Even if we could measure the number of legislative victories that each movement won as an approximation of their success, that would not support Professor
Bernstein's assertion that melioristic movements benefit democracy by involving citizens in the political process, irrespective of particular substantive outcomes. See infra

194-95 for elaboration of this point.
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with a thriving community. '
My quarrel with Bernstein is with her description of these movements,
and consequently with their democratic virtues. Contrary to her assertion,
these social movements have not used tort and crime to change individual
behavior This descriptive objection has two parts. First, the "melioristic" movements Professor Bernstein analyzes have directed their primary
efforts at regulatory reform, with change to the law of crime and tort
playing a secondary part. Second, when they have engaged the law of
tort or crime, they have done so in a way that ignores individual behavior
and is instead calculated to influence institutional behavior. My criticism
of Bernstein's description of these movements leads to a criticism of her
grounds for praising them. If they are to be praised, it is for their redistributive effects, making them hard to distinguish from cause lawyering. I
will argue in the end that Bernstein does not make a persuasive case that
they are to be praised for process virtues alone.
Have the anti-smoking, drinking, and pornography movements chosen
tort and/or crime as their primary focus? While all three movements
have at times sought reform of tort and criminal law, they have targeted
other kinds of legal reform at least as much. Consider the following examples of legal reform that are in some sense regulatory.
The most prominent regulatory achievements in all three movements
have been forms of zoning and licensing regulations.' 0 Approximately
450 municipalities had restricted smoking in restaurants, stores, and offices by 1991.11 Federal regulations restrict smoking on buses and
8 Bernstein, supra note 2, at 173.
9 At least not to influence individual behavior directly. Any social reform movement seeks to influence individual behavior indirectly at some level. But for Bernstein, intrusiveness is the distinguishing characteristic of melioristic law reform. Only
the direct intrusion that she speaks of as a coercive "barging in" makes her category
"melioristic law reform" meaningful, especially because she contrasts the category to
cause lawyering.
10 In addition to the regulations explained here, law attaches negative conse-

quences to smoking, drinking, and pornography in numerous and varied other ways.
For example, parental smoking may be raised as a negative factor in child custody
disputes. See, e.g., Unger v. Unger, 644 A.2d 691, 694 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994)
(holding that a court may consider environmental tobacco smoke in its custody determinations because it affects the health of children). Insurance regulations require
insurers to cover smoking cessation programs. See, e.g. CAL. INS. CODE § 12697.15
(West 1995) (requiring health plans to provide education encouraging smoking cessation).
11 Robert A. Kagan & David Vogel, The Politics of Smoking Regulation: Canada,
France, the United States, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE 39
(Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, eds., 1993) [hereinafter Smoking Regulation]. According to another source, over 480 municipalities had enacted such ordinances by 1990. PETER D. JACOBSON ET AL., THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF ANTISMOKING LEGISLATION 1 (1992).
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planes. 2 Municipalities regulate the placement of cigarette machines so
that children are less able to reach them.' Regulations restrict operating
hours for bars; prohibit their operation near schools, churches, and residential areas; limit the number and location of liquor stores; prescribe
minimum and maximum sales; and curtail the extension of credit to patrons. 4 Pornography is subject to zoning regulations applicable to adult
book stores and movie theaters and to restrictions on display in bookstores and libraries.' 5 Anti-smoking and anti-drinking advocates have
achieved federal labeling regulations covering tobacco products and alcohol.' 6 Anti-smoking advocates have successfully prevented tobacco companies from advertising on television and radio.' Both tobacco products
and alcohol are heavily taxed.' 8 State authorities have implemented massive anti-smoking and anti-drinking public education campaigns, and, in
some states, such as Massachusetts and California, cigarette tax revenues
are earmarked for funding anti-smoking campaigns.' 9 In some jurisdictions, agencies monopolize the sale of alcohol. Although some of these
involve criminal sanctions in a technical sense, Bernstein explicitly excludes regulatory crimes from her description of melioristic law reform.
A description of these reform movements as concerning primarily tort
and crime seems questionable.
But in each of these movements, criminal law and tort reform do play a
role; Bernstein successfully points to sound examples within each movement. Here my disagreement with Bernstein is over her assertion that
these tort and crime reform efforts concern individual behavior, at least
in the direct sense that would make melioristic law reform distinct from
other social movements. In fact, with rare exceptions, 20 these reform proposals seem carefully crafted to avoid placing tort or criminal sanctions
onto individuals, reserving judgment instead for institutions, and in particular, for small businesses and large corporations. For this reason,
Bernstein misleadingly separates these movements from others, such as
Smoking Regulation, supra note 11, at 36-37.
13 Id. at 38; JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 11, at 46.
14 KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICS OF SIN: DRUGS,
cy 160-62 (1994).
12

ALCOHOL AND PUBLIC POLI-

15 See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (holding

constitutional a zoning ordinance prohibiting adult theaters from locating within 1000
feet of any residential zone, church, park, or school).
16 Smoking Regulation, supra note 11, at 27;

MEIER,

supra note 14, at 170.

Smoking Regulation, supra note 11, at 27.
18 Id. at 38; MEIER, supra note 14, at 158.
19 Smoking Regulation, supra note 11, at 38-39.
17

20

The major exceptions are controls on drunk driving, which do focus on the indi-

vidual. These, however, can be explained through immediate safety concerns for
someone other than the individual who is drinking-other drivers. See infra, text at
note 30.
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the civil rights movement," on the dubious ground that these three intrude more on individual behavior. Consider the following examples.
Smoking crimes includes sanctions against stores for selling to minors,
and against restaurants for regulatory crimes such as failing to maintain
an adequate no-smoking section.22 Tort reform efforts have focused,
without much success to date, on suits against companies in the tobacco
industry, and against employers who seat employees near smokers.' Anti-smoking activists have not tried to make individual smokers defendants
in tort suits.
Proprietors of stores or restaurants may be criminally liable for selling
alcohol to minors. In dry jurisdictions, it is a crime to manufacture or sell
alcohol, but it is not a crime for an individual to consume alcohol.
Pornography crimes, under the narrow obscenity definition, are usually
limited to sanctions for makers, sellers, and traffickers.2 4 Possession of
pornography by an individual is criminalized only in the case of child pornography made with real children. 25 As to tort reform efforts in the antipornography movement, the Dworkin-MacKinnon statute is aimed at
manufacturers and distributors of pornography.2 6 The Pornography Victims Compensation Act, offered in Congress in 1991 and approved by the
Judiciary Committee in 1992, would have allowed victims of sexual assault to sue distributors of obscene materials or child pornography. 27 Illinois has a similar statute permitting civil suits against distributors of obscene materials.'
All of these tort and crime actions are to be brought against institu21 Bernstein sets the civil rights movement in opposition to melioristic law reform,
labeling civil rights litigation "cause lawyering." See supra note 9 and accompanying

text.
22

Regulatory crimes do not fit Bernstein's definition of melioristic law reform in

any case. Bernstein, supra note 2, at 171 n.7.

Smoking Regulation, supra note 11, at 34-45.
See RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO SEX LAWS
IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 13 (forthcoming 1996) (collecting statutes criminalizing
the possession of obscene materials).
25 This exception can be explained as an enforcement mechanism for other criminal laws that are held to be particularly important, namely, restrictions against sexual
abuse of children that are a necessary part of the making of child pornography with
real children. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982) (upholding against
First Amendment attack a statute prohibiting the distribution of child pornography).
26 The MacKinnon-Dworkin model statute is reprinted in relevant part in NADINE
23
2

STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY

75 (1995). The version of the statute adopted

by the City of Indianapolis was declared unconstitutional in American Booksellers'
Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding the statutory definition of "pornography" vague and invalidating the statute on viewpoint discrimination
grounds), aff'd mem. 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
27 STROSSEN, supra note 26, at 64.
28 Id. at 98.
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tions. Of course, the major exception to this pattern is for drunk driving.9 Otherwise, the tort and criminal law reform efforts, both in the
successful and the unsuccessful efforts, have turned their attention towards institutions rather than individuals.3"
Perhaps these reform movements have focused away from the individual because they are not trying to use law to coerce individual behavior.
Instead, they are using it for redistributive reasons. If so these movements fit Bernstein's description of cause lawyering rather than her contrasting description of melioristic law reform. The MacKinnon-Dworkin
statute seeks to redistribute 3 corporate profits from pornography to its
victims.3 " Plaintiffs' attorneys in the tobacco litigation see their clients as
casualties of the tobacco companies' profit motive, not as undesirable individuals in need of legally coercive control. They seek to redistribute
profits to tobacco victims, who are also tobacco consumers.33 The success
of these law reform movements will depend on whether they can justify
34
and achieve a reallocation of benefits from institutions to individuals.
These reform efforts are not, however, justifiable as an unusually good
exercise in democratic participation.
Bernstein is in large part trying to answer Glendon's concern about
legalism. Where Glendon says it impoverishes democratic communities,
Bernstein says it assists in their formation and sustenance. Although
29 This may be explained, consistent with my thesis that these law reform efforts do
not seek to control individual but instead institutional behavior, by noting that drunk
driving laws do not control alcohol consumption, no matter how detrimental it may be
to a person. They control behavior while drinking that is extremely and immediately
dangerous to others-driving.
30 In the tort context, this may be for the simple reason that individuals are not
good tort defendants because they lack the resources to pay a judgment large enough
to justify litigation.
31 Redistribution is primarily understood to mean wealth, but that redistribution, it
is hoped, will have its own effects. For example, in the anti-pornography movement
redistribution of wealth is expected to precede opportunities for equal expression.
32 MacKinnon and Dworkin's victims include both those harmed in the making of
pornography and those harmed by a consumer of pornography. Proponents seek
power redistribution as well as wealth redistribution from corporations to individuals.
See ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN at xxviii-xxxiv
(1981) (characterizing the model ordinance as a "mechanism for redistributing power").
as Robert L. Rabin, Institutionaland HistoricalPerspectives on Tobacco Tort Liability, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993) 118-25 (describing tort litigation against tobacco companies).
34 In addition, if they are exercises in democracy that engage big constituencies in
power struggles, as I suggest, we might expect them to come with many of the less
attractive aspects of interest group politics described in the public choice literature,
rather than the more optimistic engagement suggested by grass roots efforts to reform
the citizenry one by one.
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Glendon may be unduly pessimistic about law, Bernstein has not made
the case that Glendon is wrong. The most persuasive aspect of Bernstein's argument that melioristic law reform seeks to influence individual
behavior is her description of stigma.3 5 These movements have, within
some communities, successfully attached social stigma to smoking, the
consumption of pornography, and drinking. Here Bernstein unintentionally supports rather than refutes Glendon's case. To a lawyer, law is at
the center of these movements. To activists, however, the movements are
polycentric, with many action plans, of which law reform is only one.
Certainly the non-legal agenda of these movements includes influencing
individual behavior. But why credit the law reform aspect of the agenda
with changing our social perceptions, when other parts of the movement
focused more directly on that goal? Why think that we refrain from excessive drinking on New Year's Eve for fear of a more stringent legal
blood-alcohol content measure, rather than as a result of a public education campaign to change our thoughts about alcohol consumption?
Bernstein describes the shaming effect of social reform movements.3 6
Glendon argues that social persuasion outside of law is a superior method
of reforming individual behavior. 7 The arguments are very similar-it is
not law that does the individual work. Although the law reform efforts
described by Bernstein may find ample justification on redistributive
grounds, she has not made the case that process virtues alone can justify
them.

35 See Bernstein, supra note 2, at 178-79.
6

Id.

37 GLENDON,

supra note 1, at 271-72.

